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Care Ethics and Care Contexts: Contributions from Feminist Philosophy1  
The substantial and insightful articles in this special issue address different cultural, societal, 
and regulatory problems of healthcare in contemporary medicine. They include expectations 
of what good care is, challenges arising from social contexts, and embedded norms affecting 
practices of care. To these empirical studies I wish to contribute a perspective from feminist 
philosophy and care ethics that engages with issues in these articles.  
Carol Gilligan’s (1993) relational care ethics and Susan Sherwin’s (1992) approach to a global 
feminist ethics of healthcare are my entry points for that discussion. Gilligan examines moral 
judgment empirically and discusses ethical reflections in children, adolescents, and adults, 
critiquing gender-biased ideals of good moral reasoning. She rejects the view that the most 
advanced form of moral judgment is characterized by an emphasis on general principles of 
individual rights and justice. In its place she provides an ethics of “mature care”, which is 
grounded in knowledge of, and respect for, others – as well as for oneself. To this concept of 
relational ethics, I add the problematizations of healthcare ethics that Susan Sherwin 
introduces in her analysis of medicine and care as forms of power. She examines medical 
care practices specifically and problematizes the inherent and external power dynamics that 
shape them. These power dynamics in healthcare include carers’ as well as institutional 
control over the bodies and minds of patients, but also the status and role of expert 
knowledge in society, and moreover the global power dynamics between countries and 
economies surrounding medical technologies and how they affect care practice. The articles 
in this volume explore such dynamics and illustrate the poignancy of Sherwin’s critique as 
well as the persistent deficit in what, using Gilligan’s terminology, I call mature care practices 
in medicine. Sherwin argues that medicine facilitates the persistence of entrenched 
inequalities of gender, race, and class within and between countries via ideas of disease and 
normality. Intersectional feminist and postcolonial critique informs her model of a feminist 
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healthcare ethics, in which she widens Gilligan’s mature care approach to reflect on and 
oppose violent or patronizing practices in medical care within and between societies.  
The predominant model of biomedical ethics addresses “good care” mostly as a relationship 
between physician and patient. The basic framework for contemporary medical ethics that is 
still widely referred to has been articulated by Beauchamp and Childress (1983). They 
identify four principles that ought to guide how a medical professional treats a patient, viz. 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. The first three principles are about a 
relationship between two people. The last, justice, puts the patient in competition with 
many others for medical care and is commonly understood to be about the fair allocation of 
scarce resources. This set of principles addresses foremost physicians. It places them at the 
centre and in charge of managing the patient relation as well as the resources they have at 
their disposal, including their time and priorities in treatment choices.  
Translating such ethical principles into any concrete application inevitably means adapting 
them to local historical, socio-political, and economic conditions. Social status and power in 
all their forms – such as gender, class, race and ethnicity, age, and citizenship – come to 
matter for medical care in practice.  
From the feminist perspective I adopt, the articles in this volume present several challenges 
to the standard model of medical ethics. My aim is to explore how and what these in-depth 
studies on care contexts and feminist healthcare ethics can contribute to one another. To do 
that, I draw out aspects from the articles that contribute to critical discourses about medical 
ethics and underscore the need for mature and fairer healthcare.   
1 Problematizing Care   
I begin by noting three main challenges to basic assumptions of classical medical ethics 
brought to the fore in the articles collected here. The first two show the paradoxical effects 
of recent technological options on ethical considerations in healthcare, the third challenges 
the central position of the physician.   
The effects of technological mediations in medicine are many. Two of them relate directly to 
the crucial issue of who the patient is. The first is that the medical profession defines its duty 
as care for the individual patient. Yet, in Mathangi Krishnamurthy’s study on the diagnosis 
and treatments around a disorder in sex development in India, and in the article by Chia-Ling 
Wu, Jung-Ok Ha, and Azumi Tsuge on assisted reproductive technologies in Japan, Taiwan 
and South-Korea, we see that the patient is often not unambiguously one person. Both 
articles show how the pregnant woman, the foetus, and the family form a complex entity for 
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care in the context of diagnoses of genetic disease or multiplet pregnancy and foetal 
reduction. In contemporary obstetrics both the woman and the embryo(s) within her have 
become objects of medical attention. This can create conflicts about who the primary 
patient is, and these are often shaped by cultural moral values and prescriptive government 
orders. Karen McNamara’s study on the motivations and imaginaries of care that shape 
medical tourism in South and South East Asia also complicates the question of who the 
patient is by highlighting how family members are often directly involved in supplying means 
for, and negotiating the care of, the patient with clinical staff.  
Another effect is that most of the new techniques used in diagnosis and treatment provide 
biophysiological information about organic issues of the patient’s body. Technologies have 
shifted the medical gaze from the patient as a person to features of her body. Jenna Grant’s 
article on medical imaging technologies in the politicized contexts of Cambodia reports 
doctors expressing ambivalence about the spread of imaging technologies because they see 
it as leading to reduced skills in other diagnostic and care experience. The problematizations 
of what is seen as normal in humans are thematic in several articles. Krishnamurthy’s as well 
as Wu and colleagues’ article, stress how uses of technologies shape both the ability to 
accept what may not be quite normal, and the choices made to achieve (more) normality. 
A third way in which the articles challenge standard medical ethics concerns the central 
position of the professional caregiver. Several articles illustrate how family and friends can 
affect a patient’s care context and become part of the treatment setting. In addition, 
Krishnamurthy’s analysis, as well as Chen-I Kuan’s study on obstetricians in Taiwan show 
how physicians are bound by institutional routines in what they can and must do, how and 
when. Kuan emphasizes how the constrained working conditions in Taiwan force 
obstetricians to choose between best care provision and a good work-life balance, a choice 
some avoid by leaving the field for gynaecology.  
In my view this signals that medical and healthcare ethics have to take into account societal 
and institutional practices. The special issue contributions provide insights into how politics 
and administration shape and constrain medical services through, for instance, funding 
provisions, allocations of dedicated staff time, and regulations that affect the availability and 
use of new technologies. They make plain that, while the four principles of medical ethics 
mark out aspects of a professional ethos and how it might be translated into everyday 
practice, they fall short of providing a comprehensive approach to examining medical ethics.  
The feminist approach I discuss below also highlight that contemporary care contexts are not 
one-sided physician to patient relations. In Gilligan’s mature care ethics, relations are 
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interconnected, part of webs in which individuality is enacted. Sherwin goes much further 
with her emphasis on how care practices and the conditions that structure them reflect and 
reaffirm local and even global power hierarchies. Feminist ethics aim for mature care 
relations and this requires counteracting all forms of oppression.  
2 Gender, Care, and Maturity  
I have become increasingly aware of the crucial role of women’s voices in 
maintaining or transforming a patriarchal world. By becoming actively 
involved in this process of change, I have found myself and this book at the 
center of a psychologically and politically volatile debate in which sanity as 
well as power is at stake. (Gilligan 1993 xii) 
In a patriarchal society, not listening to what women have to say is a part of the operations 
of that power order that keep it intact. In Gilligan’s study in moral psychology, In A Different 
Voice (1993), hermeneutic analysis of interview formats and processes is used to shows that 
female voices are misunderstood in Lawrence Kohlberg’s (1981) theory of moral 
development. Gilligan rejects the finding that boys progress to advanced moral reasoning at 
a younger age than girls when asked to solve constructed moral dilemmas on the basis that 
unchecked gender norms and biases informed the data collection and interpretation. The 
female study participants tended to consider the relations between the people involved in a 
dilemma and how they might be affected by an action. Gilligan calls this a “care ethics 
perspective” and argues that it is not of less value as a moral orientation. Development to 
moral maturity is not a straight path from rule following via the adolescent questioning of 
conventional norms to the discovery of individual rights and abstract principles of justice, as 
Kohlberg had proposed. Mature development for women in a gendered society “proceeds 
from an initial concern with survival to a focus on goodness and finally to a reflective 
understanding of care as the most adequate guide to the resolution of conflicts in human 
relationships” (Gilligan 1993: 105).  
Moral maturity is a strongly care-oriented perspective, an ethical attitude towards individual 
others, a community, and the world – as well as, importantly, oneself. Awareness of and 
attention to one’s own rights and needs and to those of others inform this attitude, which 
entails seeing oneself as part of a couple, a family, a community – but it does not mean 
subordinating one’s own wishes and rights to what seems best for those larger social units. 
In experimental data from a study on the topic of abortion with university students, Gilligan 
finds instances of a self-sacrificing attitude. In follow-up interviews a few years later, some of 
the former student identify this attitude as having been damaging for themselves. Mature 
Author version: Published in Care in Translation: Care-ful Research in Medical Settings. 
Special Issue of East Asian Science, Technology and Society, edited by Catelijne Coopmans 
and Karen McNamara, Spring 2020, in press.  
 
 5 
care also means knowing that some relationship problems cannot be solved through more 
love and care for others, especially if one finds oneself not mutually duly respected as a 
partner.  
3 Professional Care  
In healthcare one might expect to find professional solutions to avoid conflicts between 
caring for others and caring for oneself, to avoid carers having to choose between a good 
personal life and delivering a high standard of care. Kuan’s study is a case that shows that 
this is not always so. The article by Chaoxiong Zhang and Priscilla Song on the methadone 
maintenance treatment (MMT) programme for heroin addicts in China also discusses care 
failures with a strong emphasis on political context. 
Zhang and Song discuss a ‘family’ care approach that was tried unsuccessfully at the 
beginning of the MMT programme. The programme was initiated following the 
Government’s proclamation that love and care ought to dominate this addiction treatment 
programme. At the same time strict success measures and targets were set that made the 
MMT programme as a project, as well as the individual carers’ careers, dependent on patient 
behaviour. In this setting mutual dependency characterizes the carer-patient relationship. 
Some patients understood this dynamic and were found exploiting it. And this, Zhang and 
Song claimed, made carers critical of providing “excessive care”. The relationship dynamics 
Gilligan considers stipulate that infantilizing adult patients by treating them like dependent 
children does not support them in acting as competent adults. Not recognizing the realities 
of either person in any adult relationship contravenes the “recognition conditions” 
presupposed in a mature care attitude and relationship.  
Pregnancy as a unique state of personhood and what this might mean for ethics has long 
been discussed at the margins of feminist philosophy (Young 1984; Kingma 2019) and is still 
underexplored. The situation Kuan’s interviewees describe is characterized by a care conflict 
heightened in obstetrics, that is as such not specific to Taiwan. Caesarean section rates 
ought to be reduced for better maternal and child wellbeing. But in a healthcare context in 
which the number of midwives is far too low, the task of building a trust relationship with 
the expecting woman is placed upon the obstetrician. Yet, accompanying a birth process 
means working for unpredictable periods of time. Personal interests and professional 
responsibilities compete for obstetricians’ (or midwives’) time. Moreover, hospitals want to 
make best use of the time of paid staff, discouraging a long wait for a vaginal delivery. In this 
conflict of values, mature care according to Gilligan cannot mean either sleeping in the 
hospital and sacrificing one’s personal life nor giving up one’s standards of best medical care 
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and conducting caesarean sections without clinical need. Individual carers are warped into a 
moral double bind and held responsible for their choices. This illustrates that mature care 
depends on care contexts that prevent such dilemmas, and thus on the institutional 
organization of care. Indeed, Kuan suggests that changes in attitude to care for women and 
in care policy are needed.  
From a perspective informed by Gilligan’s analysis of ethical care relations, patriarchal blind 
spots regarding what care means and the dilemmas it entails allow such failures and conflicts 
to arise. Her own case studies confront the underbelly of a patriarchal order in which rights 
and justice perspectives thrive on a soil of women’s caring that is as such disregarded, as are 
those who do the caring. Gilligan emphasizes that hearing the different voices of women will 
improve social cohesion and justice as well as our understanding of adult relationships. The 
rising costs of healthcare are a global political problem and under stretched budgets, the 
high cost to using new diagnostic or treatment technologies is often weighed against the 
investment in staff time and training.  Mature care demands high quality training and also 
generous time available from health carers. Moreover, it requires health care regimes in 
which trusting and professional relationships can be built and practised. 
4 Social Contexts of Healthcare 
It appears then that an ethics of healthcare must engage not only with the internal 
psychology and moral commitments that structure it, but with the situation and the 
conditions in which it occurs.  
A problematic care situation is described from both angles in these and several other 
articles. For instance, Kuan focuses on the carer’s ability to navigate the conflicting wishes, 
needs, and demands on her time. Zhang and Song focus more on the external conditions 
which can make it difficult to provide optimal care. They explain that the family approach to 
care was chosen as a response to state-driven campaigns that mandate care and love 
(guān'ài) as the right moral attitude towards marginalized groups, among them drug addicts. 
Kuan also considers the political context and what is promoted in government documents as 
framing conditions of care.  
A different side to this care dilemma, namely patients’ perceptions, is articulated by the 
subjects in McNamara’s study. She finds patients suspecting that clinicians act not with an 
attitude of care and responsibility but in a self-interested manner, putting monetary gain 
above care. Whilst it would be naïve to deny that this may often be the case, in McNamara’s 
article this suspicion becomes apparent as a facet of the politically-controlled care 
environment in a country.  
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Ideologies, volatile political priorities, and financial interests shape care. More generally, 
ideas about good (enough) care are formed and enacted in the multifaceted mundane 
conditions of institutions. These conditions are constituted by legal texts and court rulings, 
clinical guidelines, the availability of qualified staff, the local organization of work hours and 
staffing of a hospital ward, etc. To return to medical ethics, the physician has been shown to 
be less powerful than is acknowledged in Beauchamp and Childress’s four principles. 
Furthermore, Kuan, McNamara, Wu et al., and Krishnamurthy report cases where the voice 
of the female patient is neither listened to nor answered. Medical tourism and consent to 
interventions that were not wanted show how the responsibility for health outcomes is 
being shifted from the professional onto the patient, especially in cases where only 
unsatisfactory treatment options are available. Healthcare ethics must address and confront 
social and cultural norms and politics that undermine mature healthcare practice. 
5 Ethics, Care, Power  
The principle insight of feminist ethics is that oppression, however it is practiced, 
is morally wrong. (Sherwin 1992: 54)  
When, for example, feminists consider medical research, confidentiality or the new 
reproductive technologies, they need to ask not only most of the standard moral 
questions but also the general question of how the issue under consideration relates to 
the oppression of women and what the implications of a proposed policy would be for 
the political status of women. (Sherwin 1992: 55) 
Biomedical technologies continue to alter how medicine proceeds and foregrounds new 
ethical problems.  
Techniques and technologies that enable diagnosis and treatment distinguish the normal 
from that which is not, and remodel patients to fit ideas of normality. Krishnamurthy 
critiques how technologies alter the acceptance of bodies and identities that don’t conform 
to the male or female standard of expectation, as well as the medical interventions that aim 
to achieve (more) normality. But several articles also present cases where patients are not 
listened to and not invited to contribute their expertise, with decision-making dominated 
instead by technologies or normative behaviours that marginalize them. 
Sherwin’s ethics takes its starting point in practices of recognition, communication, and 
critical analysis. She configures knowledge about good care as being also held by patients, 
who are the experts of their own needs, yet often remain unheard. “Once we recognize the 
need to include oppression as a factor in health, we can no longer maintain the authoritarian 
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medical model, in which physicians are the experts on all matters of health and are 
authorized to respond to all such threats” (Sherwin 1992: 239). 
In many countries the continuation of pregnancy is still not something the pregnant woman 
can decide upon. At the same time medical professionals ensure that the right kind of 
children are born, partake in female genital mutilation, or use their skills to adapt patient 
bodies to cultural norms, risking harm to patients on the basis of questionable criteria for 
clinical necessity. Medical expertise is a form of power, and it tends to present itself as if 
untarnished by political power interests. Sherwin believes that recognizing this can help 
democratize decision-making processes in medicine and foster the development of a 
feminist mode of care. Medical ethics that are self-limited to pondering the close relations 
between a few people have no moral position from which to criticize oppressive practices 
from the outside that charge and disfigure care situations.  
Sherwin’s feminist ethics of healthcare consider relational ethics in the contexts of both 
institutional practices of exerting power as well as global differences in status and the care 
offered to vulnerable or oppressed people.  
6 Politics, Healthcare, and Medical Ethics 
Medicine is one of the institutions through which governments seek to control the social 
order. Power relations are unequal, dividing those who rule from those who submit to being 
ruled. Whilst there are various and intersecting criteria determining status and power in 
complex hierarchical societies, medical or care professions are inevitably operating along the 
fault lines thus produced. Being in charge of care, they exert some power, being involved in 
decisions and actions that affect patients’ lives.  
Sherwin examines diverse intersecting forms of marginalization and oppression, different in 
different places and for different people, but similar in the hierarchies of sex, race, and class 
that are effectively reinforced. Her book, No Longer Patient (1992), starts a systematic 
feminist debate on medical and healthcare ethics and proposes a method for solving the 
dilemma between value pluralism and respect for different cultures whilst wanting to be 
able to criticize specific practices as morally wrong. Sherwin discusses medical ethical 
problems such as abortion and female genital mutilation (FGM) and argues that ethics can 
criticize certain practices even if they are defended by a population as morally right or 
customary in their culture. A critical examination of the predominant power structures, and 
how much influence the groups most hurt by such policies have on actual policy making, 
allows the assessment of whether the views of the women supporting FGM can be deemed 
to be freely and autonomously acquired and held. The vicious cycle of oppression consists in 
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being denied a voice that counts, and bodily violated, which diminishes the sense of self-
worth and the ability to resist oppressive rules and practices.  
In my view feminist medical ethics can counteract these risks by engaging with empirical 
qualitative research. On that basis a moral philosophical and ethical understanding can 
criticize harmful or violent practices without remarginalizing women or other groups, and 
without framing them as holding irrelevant views when they justify such practices as 
traditional in their culture. Philosophical medical ethics has not generally taken up a mature, 
critical feminist perspective despite the wealth of material from qualitative social science 
studies to argue for a richer medical ethics.   
The articles in this special issue show that women’s voices are often silenced whilst 
concurrently thereby giving a podium to them. They illustrate how power is politicized and 
often invisible, and used through and in biomedicine to stabilize unequal social and global 
hierarchies. Integrating different perspectives on the topic of mature care, we have seen 
that the investment into healthcare and how it is allocated – for example to excellent staff 
training or funding the newest diagnostic technologies if both cannot be afforded – affect 
care conditions and patient experience. Similarly, cultural norms and biases about social 
status and culture shape care situations, although care professionals are advised to 
overcome such prejudices in order to provide best clinical practice fairly.  
National and cultural rank orders and strategies of presentation affect and maintain 
particular hierarchies between economies, countries, and cultures. In her quest to 
understand the motives and experiences that feed medical tourism, McNamara reports a 
case in which the paradoxes in how the patient and her family understand themselves in 
those relations are articulated. Trying to do the best one can do for a sick relative may mean 
taking out loans and bringing them abroad to where treatment is at a higher, Western 
standard – in this case from Bangladesh to Singapore. When, for example, a patient cannot 
be cured but still hopes and asks for another MRI scan, the suggestions of the physician to 
her son to go back to Bangladesh for that scan is devastating. It is perceived by the patient’s 
carer as a personal and cultural insult, demeaning the family’s social and economic standing. 
Hopes and actions are shaped by ideological geopolitical hierarchies, and the intercultural 
existence of the patient who wants better care appears in its fragility.  
The idea that medical care is better in a wealthier country represents an imaginary 
connection between GDP and healthcare. Such tropes are reinforced in advertisements for 
medical tourism in poorer countries – by contrast, lower price and reliable 
delivery/handover are used to sell stem cell therapies or surrogacy in the West. Some 
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governments are complicit in nurturing those ideas and business plans, designing regulations 
that enable clinical trials or the growth of markets for unproven treatments, reproductive 
technologies, or beauty surgery.  
The articles in this special issue touch upon more ethical issues than I have discussed here. 
As I have illustrated, they offer new case studies that can inform medical ethics generally 
and especially a feminist take that focuses on local and geopolitical power regimes and 
marginalized groups. The specificity of each care situation provides an opening to reflect on 
its specific wider societal context, as proposed by Sherwin. Feminist care ethics is well-
placed to make norms and attitudes towards gender, class, and politics matter in critiques of 
medical practice. In-depth studies on care contexts and feminist healthcare ethics can thus 
inform one another. The biggest challenge feminism raises for classical ethics is that it is 
demanding. It demands working on oneself and on personal relations as well as on one’s 
attitude to the world, which inevitably includes struggles against immoral practices, cultural 
values, and political structures. Feminist, postcolonial, and biomedical ethics have a lot of 
unfinished business. 
----- 
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